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Abstract 
Spanish banks had to set aside a countercyclical loan loss provision during the period 
2000-2004. The amount of such provision as well as the allowance accumulated had to be 
disclosed by banks. The former creates a natural experiment to test whether banks smooth 
earnings to mislead investors and other interested parties, or, by contrast, income 
smoothing is used to avoid the existence of market frictions. Using panel data econometric 
techniques, we find evidence of income smoothing through loan loss provisions during the 
period previous to the implementation of the countercyclical provision (1988-1999). 
However, during 2000-2004, banks relied only on the newly created countercyclical 
provision to smooth income. This change in behaviour suggests that there may be efficiency 
gains in reducing the volatility of accounting earnings over time.   
JEL: G18, G21, M41. 
Keywords: income smoothing, earnings management, transparency, countercyclical 
provisioning. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Los bancos españoles tuvieron que realizar provisiones estadísticas contracíclicas en el período 
2000-2004. Los bancos tenían que comunicar los importes de dichas provisiones al mercado. 
Esto crea un experimento natural que permite testar si los bancos suavizan el resultado para 
despistar a los inversores o, por el contrario, el alisamiento del resultado se utiliza para aliviar 
fricciones existentes en los mercados. Utilizando técnicas econométricas de datos de panel, 
se encuentra evidencia de alisado de resultados mediante las provisiones en el período previo 
a la implantación de las provisiones contracíclicas. Sin embargo, durante el período 2000-2004, 
los bancos alisaron el resultado solo utilizando las provisiones contracíclicas. Este cambio de 
comportamiento sugiere que deben existir ganancias de eficiencia al reducir la volatilidad de los 
resultados contables a lo largo del tiempo.  
JEL: G18, G21, M41. 
Keywords: alisamiento del resultado, transparencia, provisiones contracíclicas. 
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1 Introduction 
Earnings management, and particularly income smoothing, are well documented practices 
across firms and industries1. Moreover, several papers have provided evidence of the use of 
loan loss provisions2 by banks to smooth earnings3. 
Some of the explanations for earnings management practices refer to the conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders, together with information asymmetries that 
limit the use of efficient contracts to solve them, Lambert (1984), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995). 
For example, managers with stock options in their compensation packages could make 
discretionary accounting decisions to distort profits and share prices around the time period 
when these stock options are going to be exercised, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). 
Other explanations are based on the existence of market frictions, so that shareholders 
will benefit from a reduction in earnings volatility over time. Within this literature, income 
smoothing can respond to signalling purposes, Barnea, Ronen and Sadan (1975); to the 
intention of reducing potential losses from shareholders’ liquidity trade, Goel and Thakor 
(2003); to save on profit taxes, Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995), Collins, Shackelford 
and Wahlen (1995), Rozycki (1997); or to lower the perceived probability of bankruptcy, 
Trueman and Titman (1988). 
Evidence on whether income smoothing practices obey to the purpose of bank 
managers to mislead investors and other interested parties or, on the contrary, they respond 
to market imperfections, could be obtained if banks had at their disposal a method to smooth 
earnings that was transparent to investors. If income smoothing practices did only respond 
to efficiency considerations, once a transparent smoothing device was introduced, then 
managers would reduce or eliminate the use of discretionary loan loss provisions to manage 
earnings. On the other hand, if banks were trying to mislead investors, income smoothing will 
continue afterwards. Hunton, Libby and Mazza (2006) find that more transparent reporting 
requirements will reduce earnings management or will change the focus of earnings 
management to less visible methods. 
In some countries, for example in the US, accounting regulations stress the 
importance of accurate measurement of earnings in each time period, Wall and Koch (2000). 
In others, bank supervisory authorities and accounting regulations may be more tolerant 
with the use of loan loss provisions to create additional reserves. However, such reserves, 
and thus the actual provisions used for this purpose are hidden to external parties. 
In a framework like this, if banks have practiced income smoothing it would be in a 
non-transparent way. 
The introduction in Spain of a countercyclical loan loss provision, the so-called 
statistical provision, a few years ago, offers a unique natural experiment to test whether 
                                                                          
1. See Healy (1985), Bannister and Newman (1996), Subramanyan (1996), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006), Liu and Ryan (2006), McVay (2006), among others. 
2. We use the term loan loss provisions to refer to the reduction in net income that recognizes the credit losses incurred 
during the period (i.e. the US equivalent term would be provisions for loan and leases losses) while the accrual of these 
provisions we call it loan loss reserve (the equivalent US term would be allowance for loan and leases losses). 
3. See Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Ma (1988), Moyer (1990), Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990), Wahlen (1994), 
Wetmore and Brick (1994), Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995), Collins Shackelford and Wahlen (1995), Kim and 
Kross (1998), Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999), Liu and Ryan (2006). Note that banks might use other items 
of the profit and loss account to manage earnings, but this possibility is out of the scope of this paper. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1118 
income smoothing responds to distorted managerial incentives and behaviour or, to the 
contrary, it may respond to efficiency considerations in the presence of market imperfections. 
This provision is explicitly intended to smooth bank profits over the business cycle, Fernández 
de Lis, Martínez and Saurina (2001). If Spanish banks used general and specific loan loss 
provisions to smooth earnings before year 2000, when the statistical provision was 
introduced, but stopped doing it after this date, it could be inferred that previous accounting 
practices to reduce earnings volatility responded to efficiency considerations. This is because 
the statistical provision is transparent and thus it leaves unchanged the outsiders’ 
opportunities to evaluate managerial performance. Stopping the old smoothing practices, 
bank managers avoid the costs of discretionary accounting and achieve the desired result of 
accounting profit stability over time complying with the new regulatory requirements. 
On the contrary, if banks continue using loan loss provisions (other than the 
statistical provision) to smooth earnings after year 2000, the conclusion would be that they 
are aware that outsiders can use the same measure of profits than before to evaluate 
performance by simply adding back the statistical provision to the net accounting profit. 
This finding would support the explanation of smoothing in terms of managers’ interests to 
obtain private benefits at the expense of shareholders, together with failures in managerial 
evaluation and compensation practices. 
We find that Spanish banks use loan loss provisions to smooth earnings until year 
2000, but stop doing so afterwards. Our conclusion is that income smoothing practices 
through general and specific provisions, before the introduction of an explicit and transparent 
smoothing mechanism, among Spanish banks could respond to efficiency considerations, 
for instance to publish more stable profits and dividends over time in order to lower the 
perceived bankruptcy probability. The statistical provision makes unnecessary such practices, 
which are likely to have a cost for the banks (for example, in terms of lower regulatory capital, 
as in Spain capital regulation excluded loan loss reserves from tier 1 and from tier 2 regulatory 
capital) and they are stopped once the final purpose of stabilizing the net accounting profit 
is attained in a regulatory sponsored way. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a thorough 
description of the regulation and the change in the framework of loan loss provisions in Spain. 
Section 3 explains the econometric framework used to test income smoothing as well as 
the database. In section 4 we present the results of the empirical analysis and the discussion 
of the results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Loan loss provision framework in Spain 
Banco de España sets the accounting rules for credit institutions in Spain. Among them, 
it sets the rules for loan loss provisions. Such rules are very detailed in comparison 
with international standards, as it is explained in the following paragraphs4. Until year 2000, 
there were two classes of loan loss provisions: the specific and the general loan loss 
provisions (and their respective reserves or allowances). 
2.1 Specific loan loss provisions 
Specific loan loss provisions were applied over impaired loans, defined as those loans 
overdue 90 days or more. For those loans overdue between 3 and 6 months, the specific 
provision to be set aside was 10% of the amount overdue. The amount overdue between 6 
and 12 months had a specific provision of 25%; between 12 and 18 months 50%; between 
18 and 21 months, 75%. Finally, if the time elapsed in the overdue status was more than 
21 months, the specific provision had to reach the 100%, that is, full coverage of the overdue 
loan after 21 months overdue or 2 years after the first date of delinquency. Therefore, 
the specific provision was tied to the time and the amount overdue. 
The former calendar for specific provisions had a significant exception. Specific 
provisions for impaired mortgages (with a loan to value ratio up to 80%) were much more 
protracted in time. For loans overdue up to 3 years, there was no provisioning requirement; 
between 3 and 4 years, 25%; between 4 and 5 years, 50%; between 5 and 6 years, 75%; 
and 100% for those past due 6 years. 
In most countries, specific provisions are applied over the total amount pending, 
not just on the overdue amount. In the case of Spain, only if a loan had been in arrears 
for one year, the provision was applied to the whole amount due, not only to the instalments 
overdue. That is, for mortgages in arrears, the first 25% provision (in years 3 to 4) was 
applied over the total amount of the loan pending. Moreover, if the 25% of the due amount 
was overdue, the whole outstanding amount of the loan had to be used in order to calculate 
the specific provision for that loan. In addition, there were thresholds and linkages between 
several facilities pertaining to the same borrower in order to determine the final coverage. 
For example, if a borrower had several loans from a bank, when the overdue amount reached 
the 25% of the total due amount of the borrower, the specific provision had to be set aside 
based on that whole amount, and not only on the overdue loans. 
Note that the Spanish regulation also allowed to classify as doubtful an asset that 
was still performing, but with a high probability of becoming impaired (i.e. defaulted). Banks’ 
managers, when deciding to classify an asset under this category, should follow objective 
criteria. In this case the specific provision had to be set as a function of the expected loss, 
and the bank had to estimate this expected loss following the most prudent criteria. In any 
case, there was a minimum specific provision (25%) for those assets classified as doubtful, 
but still performing. 
                                                                          
4. We focus on the period 1988-2004. Since January 2005 the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS, 
formerly, International Accounting Standards or IAS) have come into effect in Spain, changing again loan loss 
provision rules. 
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In spite of the former set of detailed rules, in contrast with many countries, including 
the US, where the amount of specific and general loan loss provisions is left to managers’ 
judgement [Beattie et al. (1995) and World Bank (2002)], Spanish banks retain some room 
for discretion, both in terms of the classification of an asset as doubtful, and in terms of the 
specific provision to be set aside (in particular, for those doubtful assets still performing). 
For instance, it is possible to classify a loan as doubtful even if it is still performing in cases 
where the probability of default is high (such a probability has to be evaluated by banks’ 
managers). In those cases, the specific provisions aim at covering the expected loss, which, 
again, must be estimated by banks’ managers. Although there are some objective criteria to 
guide this process (a minimum provision threshold of 10% or 25% depending on the available 
information about the loan and the quality of the borrower), banks have a certain degree of 
discretion in setting those provisions (for instance, misclassifying assets and over or under 
provisioning expected losses). Such discretion can go either way: more doubtful assets and, 
thus, more provisions or vice versa5. 
Indirect evidence of the former stems from banks’ annual reports which sometimes 
and for particular banks show significant changes (increases usually) in loan loss provisions. 
Usually, such changes come soon after a supervisor inspection of the loan portfolio quality 
of the bank. Thus, bank managers seem to have certain discretion to classify loans 
(i.e. unimpaired versus impaired) and to set aside provisions, despite the detailed set of rules 
governing Spanish loan loss provisions6. 
2.2 General loan loss provisions 
Apart from the specific provisions, during the period analysed Spain also had in place a 
compulsory general provision for unimpaired loans. The provision was 1% of the amount 
granted for all loans except for mortgages (with loan to value ratio up to 80%) that was set 
at 0.5%. That is, at inception, when the loan was granted banks had to set aside a general 
provision calculated over the whole amount lend. That provision was applied only to 
unimpaired loans.  
2.3 Countercyclical loan loss provisions 
From July 2000 until the end of 2004 Spanish banks have accrued a countercyclical loan 
loss provision the so-called statistical provision. A detailed explanation of its rational, 
objectives and mechanism is in Fernández de Lis, Martínez and Saurina (2001). As 
mentioned before, from 2005 onwards, Spanish accounting rules follow the International 
Financial Reporting Standards7. 
Essentially, the statistical provision is so that during good times, Spanish banks have 
to set aside provisions for the expected losses that are embedded in expanding credit 
portfolios. The provisions made during those years are used to build up the so-called 
statistical reserve (or statistical allowance) that might be depleted in bad times when the 
excesses of the last upturn appear in the form of impaired assets. The former is achieved 
by comparing every quarter the latent loss in the credit portfolio with the amount of specific 
                                                                          
5. Moreover, as Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) point out, reported accounting amounts reflect not only the accounting 
rules in place but also the degree to which institutions exist to enforce them. 
6. Significant declines in loan loss provisions as a result of asset reclassifications after inspections are more rare 
as a prudential supervisor is more inclined to accept buffers (such as allowances for loan losses) that will help the bank 
to cope with future difficulties. 
7. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) link this provision with the cyclical oscillations of bank reserves proposed by Holmstrom 
and Tirole (2000). Readers interested in the changes in the loan loss provisioning system in Spain after 2005 as well as 
its impact may refer to Saurina (2009a and 2009b). 
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provisions (which fluctuates significantly along the business cycle). That difference, if positive, 
is charged into the Profit and Loss account (P&L) whereas, if negative, is written as income in 
the P&L statement (provided that the statistical reserve has been previously build up). 
Given that the specific loan loss provisions are tied up to impaired loans, which fluctuate 
markedly according to the business cycle, during good times the specific provisions are very 
low and, thus, the statistical provision is positive, increasing the size of the statistical reserve. 
In bad times, when impaired loans increase significantly, the statistical provision becomes 
negative, depleting the statistical reserve accrued along good times. That is the reason 
why the statistical provision is countercyclical: in good times increases while decreasing in 
bad times. 
The latent loss, for most of the banks, is calculated using a standard approach 
given by Banco de España8. This approach consists on six buckets (ordered form low to high 
credit risk) and a set of 6 fixed parameters associated to each bucket. Thus, the loan portfolio 
is divided in six categories (i.e. loans to governments, mortgages, other garanteed loans, 
loans to firms, consumption loans and credit cards), each one with a parameter that proxies 
the average loss along the business cycle (from 0.1% to 1.5%). The latent loss is calculated 
as the parameter times the exposure in each risk bucket and added up across the six risk 
categories. The standard approach used to calculate the latent loss means that, in general, 
all banks present a similar smooth pattern of latent losses along the business cycle. 
The variability along the cycle comes from the specific provision, which is very low in good 
times (very low levels of overdue loans), and very high in bad ones, when impairments 
and problem loans increase significantly. 
All in all, from 2000 to 2004, the total loan loss provision (TLLP) of Spanish 
banks was: 
 SPLrGPSPTLLP   (1) 
where, SP stands for the specific provision, GP for the general one and Lr for the latent loss. 
The term between brackets is the countercyclical or statistical provision. 
By design, the inclusion of a statistical provision produces flat total loan loss 
provision ratios (i.e. loan loss provisions over total loans) through the business cycle (both GP 
and Lr are mainly constant in relative terms along the cycle). Thus, the statistical provision 
introduces a smoothing mechanism in loan loss provisions and, by extension, in bank profits9. 
Moreover, and this is of key importance for the issue we are pursuing in this paper, 
the countercyclical mechanism is transparent since each bank is obliged to disclose the 
amount of the statistical provision. Therefore, in fact, investors and any other interested 
parties can separate the smoothing effect brought about by the statistical provision. 
Conversely, bank managers know that the smoothing effect of the new provisioning tool 
is fully observed and appraised by outsiders. 
The interest of the paper is to test whether or not bank managers have changed their 
behaviour regarding smoothing of profits through general and specific loan loss provisions 
once they have at their disposal a transparent income smoothing device. 
                                                                          
8. Banco de España also allows banks to develop and use their own internal models to compute the statistical provision. 
In this case, the model must be approved by Banco de España. 
9. We show this more in detail in Appendix 1. 
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3 Econometric model and data set 
In order to evaluate the impact of the transparent smoothing device in the behaviour of 
banks, we set out the standard test of income smoothing proposed in the literature10. 
We differentiate two periods, before the statistical provision (1988-1999) and when it was 
in force (2000-2004). The hypothesis to be tested is that loan loss provisions excluded the 
statistical one, CLLPit, are determined as a combination of the credit risk position of the bank 
and of the level of profits unaffected by the provision, NOIit. The model is extended including 
lagged regulatory capital, Cit-1, (to account for possible capital management in addition to 
income smoothing in loan loss provision decisions) and includes also a list of control variables: 
 
itiititit VariablesControlCNOIRISKCREDITfCLLP   1)(  
where α, , , ,  are parameters to be estimated. Therefore, if loan loss provisions are set 
only as a response to credit risk,  and  are equal to zero (i.e. banks do not use loan loss 
provisions to manage profits and/or capital). The null hypothesis of no income smoothing 
is made under the premise that smoothing can be costly (for example, in terms of lower 
retained earnings). 
Equation (2) resembles the empirical model used in the literature either to test for 
income smoothing, to test for capital management, or both. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), Ma 
(1988) and Wetmore and Brick (1994) all regress loan loss provisions on current net operating 
income, non-performing loan ratios and some additional variables as credit portfolio structure. 
The empirical literature on banks usually analyses both income smoothing and capital 
management at the same time. Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) regresses loan loss 
provisions on earnings before provisions and tier 1 capital before loan loss reserves. A similar 
equation and explanatory variables are used in Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995), Collins, 
Shackelford, and Wahlen (1995) and Moyer (1990), although as a part of a multiple equation 
framework where other discretionary items are also considered. Wahlen (1994) and Kim and 
Kross (1998) focus only on loan loss provisions and charge-offs simultaneously11. 
Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988); Ma (1988); Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1990); 
Wahlen (1994); Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen (1995); and Kim and Kross (1998) find 
evidence on income smoothing with loan loss provisions whilst Wetmore and Brick (1994), 
and Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) reject it. Moyer (1990), Beatty, Chamberlain and 
Magliolo (1995) and Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) find evidence of a negative 
relationship between capital and loan loss provisions for US banks. Kim and Kross (1998) find 
evidence of capital management in low capitalised banks. 
Once the credit risk and control variables are made explicit, the empirical model to 
be estimated is formulated as follows: 
itiititittittitit SIZECAPNOIGDPGLTAIBOLNPLCCLLP   14321  
                                                                          
10. See, for instance, Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999). 
11. Beaver et al. (1989); Wahlen (1994); Beaver and Engle (1996) and Liu, Ryan and Wahlen (1997) focus on the 
impact of loan loss provisions on the market value of the banks, distinguishing between the discretionary 
and the non-discretionary components of LLP. 
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The dependent variable CLLPit is the value of net loan loss provisions excluded 
the statistical one of bank i in year t. The variable is normalised by the total assets of the 
bank to avoid spurious size effects in the explanation of provisions. 
The variables that proxy the credit risk of the bank, CREDIT RISK, are NPL, IBOL, 
LTA and GDPD. The variable NPL measures the doubtful assets of bank i in period t, 
according to its balance sheet data, and normalised by the total assets of the bank12. IBOL is 
the general index of stocks listed in the Madrid Stock exchange also in year t. It is intended 
to capture expectations about future economic conditions which can affect the current loan 
loss provision decisions of banks. LTA, the ratio of total loans to total assets, is a proxy for 
the risk profile of the bank. The more loans to the retail or the corporate sector, the higher the 
risk tolerance of bank managers (the alternative is to buy far safer Spanish government bonds 
or to lend to other Spanish banks). GDPG is the rate of growth of Spanish Gross Domestic 
Product in year t. It is intended to capture the effect of macroeconomic conditions (business 
cycle) on loan loss provisions, beyond the risk profile of a particular bank. Coefficients of NPL 
and LTA are expected to be positive and those of IBOL and GDPG negative. 
The inclusion of an explicit measure of the business cycle offers us the possibility 
of testing the cyclical pattern of CLLP, when controlling for other explanatory variables. 
The strong cyclical pattern of loan loss provisions was one of the prudential arguments used by 
Banco de España to create the statistical provision13, coupled with the well known fact 
that credit risk mistakes are made during good times when over optimism is pervasive and 
credit standards are relaxed [Crockett (1997), Rajan (1994) and Manove and Padilla (1999)]. 
The variable NOI is the net operating income (profits before provisions and 
extraordinary items) of bank i in period t, normalised by total assets of the bank. If there is 
income smoothing a positive and significant value for the coefficient of this explanatory 
variable is expected. 
The variable CAP is the total capital ratio of the bank at the beginning of period t 
(end of period t-1). The numerator does not include the general loan loss reserve and the 
denominator is the risk-weighted assets (RWA). Under Spanish regulation, general loan loss 
reserves are excluded from regulatory capital (i.e. not counted as tier 2 capital)14. If banks 
determine general and specific loan loss provisions with the purpose of managing capital, 
a positive coefficient is expected for this variable15. 
The variable SIZE is the log of total assets. It is included as a control variable. 
We do not have any strong a priori about the expected sign, although credit portfolio 
diversification would point towards a negative sign for μ. 
                                                                          
12. We focus on the level of the non-performing loans ratio instead of in the change in the ratio. That is mainly the 
result of the Spanish system of recognition of problem loans. Usually, after 90 days of an overdue loan, the whole 
amount of the loan is classified as non-performing and specific provisions start to be made. However, in Spain, only 
the overdue part of the loan is classified as non-performing and being provisioned. Thus, non-performing loans 
evolve much less abruptly than abroad. Instead of a big jump after 90 days overdue, the increase in problem loans is 
more deferred along time. 
13. Laeven and Majnoni (2003) are also interested in testing the cyclical pattern of loan loss provisions. More generally, 
during Basel II discussions, the issue of procyclicality of capital requirements has risen a lot of attention. Taylor and 
Goodhart (2004) contain a good summary of that discussion as well as many references. Note that procyclicality of loan 
loss provisions would increase additionally the pressure on bank capital during bad times. More generally, the role of 
accounting standards on financial stability is addressed in Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2005). 
14. Note that, in other frameworks, general provisions are counted as tier 2 capital. For instance, in Basel I they can be 
included in the definition of tier 2 with the limit of 1.25% of the risk-weighted assets. 
15. Some papers test for capital management using un-weighted total assets due to the lack of data on RWA. 
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Finally, ηi reflects unobserved bank-individual characteristics that are constant along 
time. Among those characteristics, it should be included the bank risk profile. Credit policies 
are not changed from one day to the other. Usually, they are deeply established and 
permeate the whole banking organisation. Therefore, it is possible to assign to each bank 
a kind of characteristic risk profile that defines its particular way to manage credit risk. εit is 
the random error. 
In order to test the change in the behaviour of bank managers, we run regression (3) 
through two separate periods, before and after 2000. The comparison of parameter  across 
both time periods will inform us of any possible change in behaviour. 
Equation (3) is estimated with the DPD package developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1988). Variables are in differences to control for unobserved bank individual effects. 
Since CLLP and some of the explanatory variables, NPL, NOI, LTA, CAP, can be jointly 
determined we make use of the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator for NPL, LTA, 
CAP and NOI using as instruments two and three-year lags of these four variables. 
3.1 Data set 
The data come from accounting statements of consolidated banking groups from 1988 
till 2004. We focus on consolidated data because capital requirements are calculated at a 
group level, irrespective that each individual bank has to have satisfactory available capital. 
Both commercial and savings banks have been included, representing more than 95% of 
total market share of credit institutions. Only foreign bank branches and credit co-operatives 
have been excluded. Our panel is unbalanced since new institutions have started to operate 
during the period considered while others have ceased to exist. Under these premises 
an unbalanced panel has been obtained comprising up to 138 banks over a period of up 
to 17 years, totalling 1374 observations. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. The flow of statistical and 
general loan loss provisions is, on average, around 0.4% of total assets. However, there is 
quite variation across banks, with a maximum of 3.56% of total assets and a minimum 
of -1.12%, which means that the bank recovered loan loss provisions set aside previously as 
a result of an improvement in the non-performing loans. The problem loans ratio also shows a 
lot of variation as there are many differences across banks regarding risk appetite. The period 
analysed, 1988-2004, contains a whole business cycle, with a recession around 1993 and 
other periods of strong growth (i.e. GDP growth goes from a maximum of 5.1% in real terms 
to -1.03%). The loan specialization varies also across banks, with an average value around 
half of the total assets. 
Regarding profitability and solvency, in average terms, the banks analysed in the 
sample, which cover more than 90% of total assets of Spanish banks, show a reasonable 
average operating income as a percent of total assets (1.38%), although some banks 
make losses some years. On the contrary, other banks earn fatter margins. Solvency 
levels are, on average, quite high, although some banks are below the minimum levels in 
some particular years16. 
                                                                          
16. Note that in Spain from 1985 to 1993 there was in place a capital adequacy ratio calculated as the higher of a ratio 
of equity over total assets of 5%, and a risk weighted assets ratio under which a different level of capital was required 
(going from 0.25% to 35%), depending on its risk level. 
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4 Empirical results and discussion 
The first column of Table 2 contains the results of the estimation of equation (3) in first 
differences for the period 1988-1999. The results are the one-step estimates robust to 
heteroskedasticity provided by DPD. As expected, there is autocorrelation of first order 
but not of second order (through differentiation we have created artificially autocorrelation 
of first order in the residuals). The test of adequacy of instruments (Sargan test) is also 
satisfactory. 
Regarding the NOI, its positive and significant coefficient rejects the null hypothesis 
that Spanish banks do not use general and specific loan loss provisions to smooth income 
in the period 1988 to 1999. Thus, despite the potential costs in terms of retained earnings, 
banks smooth their accounting profits. 
Apart from being significant statistically, the impact of the smoothing practice 
is economically relevant. Computing the long-term semi-elasticity shows that an increase of 
1 percentage point in NOI (from its average value of the period 1988-1999) might increase 
the ratio of the current specific and general loan loss provisions over total assets by 31%. 
Alternatively, one standard deviation increase in NOI means an increase in CLLP of 26%. 
The remaining parameter estimates also provide interesting results. On the one hand, 
the parameter of the total capital ratio lagged one-year, CAP, is not significantly different from 
zero. Therefore, there is no evidence of capital management through loan loss provisions 
among Spanish banks. 
On the other hand, the coefficients of the credit risk proxy variables all have the 
expected sign. The coefficient of non-performing loans over total assts, NPL, is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. Thus, the more overdue loans the bank has, the higher 
the provisions it sets aside. Similar results are obtained for the coefficient of loans over total 
assets, LTA, positive and significant. Thus, the riskier the bank, the more provisions it makes. 
IBOL and GDPG have negative estimated coefficients, both statistically significant at the 
5% level. Expectations from the Stock market do affect current loan loss provision decisions 
of banks, after controlling for the rest of the variables. On the other hand, the business cycle 
affects loan loss provision decisions of banks, in a countercyclical way, even after controlling 
for the bank level risk variables, such as NPL and LTA. All in all, Spanish banks during the 
period 1988-1999 seem to set aside provisions according to their determinants. The control 
variable SIZE does not have a significant effect on loan loss provisions. 
The second column of Table 2 shows the results for the period 2000-2004. Again, 
autocorrelation tests of the residuals are satisfactory as well as the Sargan test. The key 
parameter in column 2 results is the one of NOI. It is positive but it is not significantly different 
from zero. Therefore, it seems that in the period when the statistical provision was in place, 
bank managers stop using other loan loss provisions as an income smoothing mechanism. 
The fact that the statistical provision offers them a smoothing device could explain that 
change, even if it is a transparent mechanism. It might be possible that banks are not trying 
to hide per se their current profits (either upwards or downwards) but to provide some 
stability to the profit and loss account to avoid certain market imperfections. 
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Regarding the other variables, the coefficient of the non-performing loan ratio (NPL) 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the estimated coefficient 
doubles that of the previous period and the coefficient of the GDP growth is negative 
and larger in absolute value17, although only significant at the 10% level. For this period 
expectations from the stock exchange and the proxy for the risk profile of the bank (LTA) 
are not significant. Thus, now general and specific loan loss provisions respond relatively 
more to variables that reflect the direct risk profile of the bank (i.e. NPL) while other indirect 
risk proxies (LTA) are less informative. The same happens with GDPG and IBOL, the former 
a more direct measure of the business cycle position. As in the previous period, there is no 
evidence of capital management through general and specific loan loss provisions. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show the results of the income smoothing tests for the 
two time periods, before and after year 2000, allowing for possible differences in intensity 
of these practices between commercial and savings banks. We test whether commercial and 
savings banks, the former owned by shareholders and the latter with no shareholders 
(i.e. not-for-profit banks), behave similarly or not regarding smoothing through general 
and specific loan loss provisions. Such a test is performed using a dummy variable, BANK, 
worth 1 if the bank is a commercial one and zero if it is a savings bank, which multiplies 
the continuous variable NOI. If the parameter associated to such a multiplicative variable 
is significant, it means that the impact of smoothing differs across banks of different 
ownership form. 
Column 3 results show that for the period 1988-1999, although there is evidence 
of smoothing through loan loss provisions in both ownership forms of banks, there are no 
differences in such behaviour between commercial and savings banks (i.e. the parameter 
of NOI times the dummy variable BANK is not significant). The other results in terms of 
estimated coefficients for the rest of explanatory variables do not change with respect 
to those of column 1. Results in column 4, when the model is estimated for the period 
2000-2004, show that general and specific loan loss provisions are no longer used to smooth 
earnings by neither of the two forms of bank ownership, commercial or savings banks. 
Therefore, the practice of income smoothing is not related to the ownership form of the 
bank or, alternatively, managers of commercial banks, with private shareholders, do not seem 
more or less interested in smoothing earnings than their counterparts at not-for-profit banks. 
The costs and benefits of income smoothing, if any, do not seem to vary with the ownership 
form of the bank even though managers of savings banks are expected to have more 
discretionary power than mangers of commercial banks. 
Maybe the importance of smoothing is not based on the type of bank but on 
whether the bank is public or private (i.e. quoted in the Stock Exchange or not). After all, 
some of the theoretical explanations of income smoothing have to do with adverse selection 
problems between owners/managers and small shareholders of listed firms, as well as 
with costs of liquidity concerns. The empirical findings are mixed18. To test for that, we carry 
out a similar test as that the one performed for commercial versus savings banks. However, 
now banks are separated into banks listed in the stock market and banks not listed by means 
                                                                          
17. The increase in the value of the estimated coefficients of the credit risk variables is coherent with the fact that 
when loan loss provisions are not used to manage the income statement, they depend on the credit risk variables 
with more intensity. 
18. Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) find that European private firms exhibit more earnings management than public 
ones. Cheng and Warfield (2005) show that the more equity incentives managers have, the more earnings management 
they carry out. Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002) find that public banks engage in more earnings management. 
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of a dummy variable QUOTED, worth 1 if the bank is quoted and 0 otherwise (i.e. non-quoted 
commercial bank or savings bank). 
Column 5 in Table 2 shows that for the period 1988-1999, quoted banks had 
no different behaviour regarding smoothing than the rest of the other non-quoted banks. 
There is income smoothing for all banks during the period and the rest of the parameters 
do not change in sign or degree of signification. The last column in Table 2 shows that for 
the second period, again, there is no income smoothing and no difference in the behaviour 
of quoted and non-quoted banks is detected. Thus, the signalling explanation of income 
smoothing, much more relevant for quoted banks, does not seem to apply. 
4.1 Robustness analysis 
Table 3 presents additional estimations of basic model (3) to show that Table 2 results are 
invariant to changes in the way the solvency variable or the capital ratio CAP is computed. 
The first two columns, for the 1988-1999 period, show that conclusions about the use of 
general and specific loan loss provisions to smooth earnings are not affected when the 
solvency ratio we use is the tier 1 capital ratio (CAPT1) or the capital buffer (BUFFER)19. 
More important, the value of the parameter of NOI is very similar to that of the first column 
of Table 2. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 replicate the results for the period 2000-2004 with 
those alternative measures of the solvency ratio, obtaining similar results to those of Table 2. 
During the period when the statistical provision is in place general and specific loan loss 
provisions are set independently of the net operating income of banks. The robustness of the 
conclusions is also confirmed by the results in columns 3 and 6, obtained excluding 
the solvency ratio from the list of explanatory variables. Again, we find that Spanish banks 
have been using general and specific provisions to smooth income during 1989 to 1999, 
but this practice stops after the introduction of the statistical provision in year 2000. 
Although the results are not reported, we estimated an augment specification 
of equation (3) by including the endogenous variable lagged one period as an additional 
explanatory variable. As mentioned in section 2, specific provisions evolve in Spain according 
to a calendar linked to the past due age of the non-performing loans. Therefore, it might be 
reasonable to expect that today’s loan loss provisions will be highly correlated to those 
of last year and it makes sense to check if the results on income smoothing are affected 
by the persistence in the provisioning ratio. None of the previous results obtained from 
Table 2 was altered by the augmented model20. 
Finally, we provide evidence that when loan loss provisions include the statistical 
provision together with the general and the specific ones, income smoothing can no longer be 
rejected as one would expect from the way the statistical provision is determined. According 
to Table 4, the estimated coefficient of NOI is now positive and significant (at the 10% level). 
That precisely reflects the smoothing mechanism associated to the statistical provision 
                                                                          
19. Essentially, the capital buffer is the difference between the effective amount of own funds hold by the bank and the 
minimum requirement over the minimum requirement. A detailed discussion of the calculation of the buffer as well as 
its determinants is in Ayuso, Pérez and Saurina (2004). 
20. As an additional robustness test, we have carried out a simple OLS estimation of the basic model (again not shown 
for the sake of conciseness). We do believe that the proper way to analyze the panel data we have build up is through 
GMM techniques [Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) argue in favour of GMM estimators instead of OLS regressions in 
testing income smoothing]. In fact, OLS results confirm that the regressions in both sub-periods show autocorrelation 
in the residuals. In any case, even taking into account that autocorrelation, the qualitative results hold as the parameter 
of the NOI is positive and significant in the first period and positive but not significant in the second one. The problem 
loan ratio and the GDP growth rate are significant and very similar to the results in Table 2. Thus, even using a OLS 
technique, the results regarding smoothing do not change. 
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(i.e. it increases in good times, NOI high, and decreases in bad times, NOI low) since, as seen 
in the second column of Table 2, the specific plus the general provisions show no sign of 
smoothing during that period. The same result holds using the tier 1 ratio (second column) 
and the buffer (third column) as measures of capital or when we include the lagged 
endogenous variable (not shown). In all these cases the GDPG parameter is not significant, 
because, as explained in section 2, the introduction of the statistical provision implies, among 
other considerations, flat total loan loss provision ratios21. 
4.2 Discussion 
The empirical analysis makes clear that Spanish banks used specific and general loan 
loss provisions, the only ones available at that time, to smooth earnings in the period 1988 
to 1999. They did so even though Spanish regulation does not include loan loss reserves 
as part of the regulatory capital and the smoothing practice had higher costs, in terms 
of lowering regulatory capital, than in other countries where loan loss reserves are part of 
regulatory capital. Therefore, income smoothing must have some benefits for bank managers, 
shareholders or both. 
The empirical evidence also shows that banks stop using loan loss provisions to 
smooth income after 1999, when the accounting regulatory authority, Banco de España, 
introduced a new provision with explicit income smoothing purposes, so that banks 
complying with the regulation show less variability of profits over time. 
The statistical provision is transparent and if bank managers obtained private 
benefits (at the expense of shareholders and investors) from the old smoothing practices, 
the incentives to continue using general and specific provisions to smooth income, would be 
unchanged after year 1999. The reason is that management performance can easily 
be evaluated now by the same measure of accounting profit than before. So the experiment 
of introducing a transparent statistical provision allows us to explore the issue of who benefits 
from income smoothing: managers, shareholders or both. The fact that general and specific 
loan loss provisions no longer depend on the net operating income after 1999 suggests 
that bank managers do not pursue hidden objectives when they smooth income and that 
smoothing can serve efficiency purposes in a world of market frictions. The conclusion 
is strengthened by the additional evidence that old and new smoothing practices do not 
show significant differences across banks of different ownership form, commercial for-profit 
banks and not-for-profit savings banks, and across listed and non-listed banks. The former 
is consistent with Hunton, Libby and Mazza (2006) of a negative association between 
transparency and earnings management and, more broadly, with Plantin, Sapra and 
Shin (2005) assessment of mark to market accounting impact on financial stability. 
The statistical provision is not tax-deductible and the benefits of smoothing 
appear to be the same for banks with shareholders than for banks with no shareholders 
(i.e. savings banks). This excludes tax and signalling considerations as potential drivers 
of income smoothing. However, both commercial and savings banks issue debt (senior and 
subordinated) and, thus, they will be concerned about bankruptcy costs and they will try to 
lower their cost of capital. Income smoothing is a way to smooth dividends and retained 
                                                                          
21. We also performed other robustness tests that are not reported here for the sake of conciseness. Among them, 
a regression for the complete sample period in order to rule out the possibility that the coefficients of the second 
sub-sample period could be less robust due to the lower amount of observations due to a shorter time span. In this 
regression we have allowed for changes in NOI after year 2000. The coefficient of NOI is positive and significant 
for the whole period, while it becomes negative (and significant) after year 2000. Thus, the main result of the paper holds 
(i.e. income smoothing declines after the introduction of the statistical provision in year 2000). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1118 
earning for a given pay-out ratio (savings banks pay the so-called social dividend from 
net profits). The evidence found in the paper points towards lowering the cost of capital, 
Trueman and Titman (1988), as the main benefit behind income smoothing among 
Spanish banks. Savings banks are not quoted. When we add the rest of private commercial 
banks and compare them with the remaining quoted commercial banks (i.e. public banks), 
we do not find differences in earnings management behaviour between both types of 
banks. This result reinforces the cost of capital argument. 
The statistical provision was originated by the concern of the Spanish banking 
supervisory authority about the cyclical profile of general and specific loan loss provisions. 
These concerns have been also expressed by others, including Laeven and Majnoni (2003) 
and Holmstrom and Tirole (2000). If provisions focus only on realised losses, without taking 
into account expected losses lurking in credit portfolios and waiting for the next recession 
to show up, then banking fragility might increase. A countercyclical provision, such as the 
statistical one studied in the paper, based on expected losses or on incurred, at a portfolio 
level, but not yet individually identified losses (i.e. latent or inherent losses), may be a way 
to keep at bay the former concerns22. Our results in the paper suggest that regulatory 
concerns about implementing accounting practices that match profits with cyclical patterns 
of credit risk, can be aligned with those of bank managers who obtain benefits in terms of 
lower cost of capital from the reduced earning volatility resulting from them. 
Finally, the results of the paper pose some puzzle for those theoretical models 
and empirical explanations of income smoothing based solely on the incentives than 
the managers might have in hiding their current level of profits. Beyond their desire 
to protect their tenure and enjoy their rents, Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), it might be 
also possible that the current accounting framework is too rigid, so that it creates too much 
volatility (i.e. procyclicality) in profits. Conventional loan loss provisions are governed by 
specific provisions which are backward looking (i.e. they are set as overdue loans appear). 
Countercyclical loan loss provisions are more forward looking and, provided that they are 
properly disclosed, could help to alleviate the hidden-smoothing problem in reporting profits. 
Probably, both managers and investors would improve. Of course, the evidence that bank 
managers do not seem to obtain private benefits at the expense of shareholders from 
income smoothing, does not imply that managers cannot use other earnings management 
devices to alter accounting profits in an interested way as, for example, in response to 
compensation packages that incorporate stock options. 
                                                                          
22. Jiménez and Saurina (2006) contain a practical proposal, as well as the rational for it. Benston and Wall (2004 and 
2005) argue that reported net income may be biased if a bank is experiencing rapid credit growth in loans that might 
go bad not before several years. In that case, the recognition of some of the interest payments should be deferred 
until it can be matched against the related credit risk. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have studied the impact that a change in the regulatory framework of loan 
loss provisions in Spain (i.e. the introduction of a countercyclical loan loss provision, 
the so-called statistical provision) has had in banks’ managers incentives to smooth income. 
Given the fact that the statistical provision is an explicit and transparent smoothing 
mechanism, we are able to run a unique natural experiment in order to test whether bank 
managers have incentives to distort profit reporting in their own benefit (i.e. to hide profits) 
or, on the contrary, there are other explanations, based on market imperfections, that make 
such a smoothing behaviour beneficial also for shareholders and other interested parties. 
Using the standard panel data econometric methodology, we find clear evidence of 
income smoothing through general and specific loan loss provisions among Spanish banks. 
But that smoothing is only present in the period 1988-1999 when banks did not applied the 
statistical provision. On the contrary, for the period, 2000-2004, when banks had to set aside 
the statistical provision (as well as the specific and the general ones), there is no evidence of 
income smoothing. Therefore, it seems that when banks are offered a transparent smoothing 
mechanism they stop smoothing profits in a non-transparent way (i.e. setting the desired level 
of loan loss provisions as a function not only of the credit risk determinants but also of long 
term profit targets). 
Other alternative explanations for smoothing (such as tax reasons, signalling for 
quoted versus non-quoted banks, differences between shareholders controlled banks or 
managers controlled savings banks) are also rejected by the data. The remaining explanation 
would be that asymmetries of information between bank managers and investors produce 
an increase the cost of capital and an increase of the probability of default for banks, 
Trueman and Titman (1988). In order to mitigate such cost increases bank managers 
are inclined to use earnings smoothing devices, either transparent if available (such as the 
statistical provision) or more hidden (as the previous specific and general loan loss provisions). 
All in all, maybe managers have no intrinsic will to hide excess volatility in their profit 
and loss accounts. Rather, they do it in a non-transparent way because there is no 
mechanism to do it transparently. Once such mechanism is in place, banks stop smoothing 
income in an opaque way. Again, this enhances the value of accounting disclosure and opens 
the debate about countercyclical loan loss provisions and, more broadly, on the impact of 
mark-to-market on financial stability [Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2005)]. 
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Appendix 1. The workings of the statistical provision 
Following Fernádez de Lis, Martínez and Saurina (2001), we can model the statistical 
provision as follows. The old system is the one previous to the introduction of the 
statistical provision. The new system is the one for the period 2000-2004 when the statistical 
provision is added to the specific and the general ones. 
Old system 
For the General provision the Allowance is GF = g*L, where L stands for total loans 
and g for the parameter (between 0.5% and 1%), while the annual provision is GP = g*L. 
For the Specific provision, the allowance is SF = e*M, where M stands for problem 
loans and e for the parameter (between 10% and 100%), while the annual provision 
is SP = e*M. Thus, the annual total provision in the old system (general + specific) is: 
AP = GP + SP = g*L + e*M. 
New system 
The General and Specific provisions are set aside as before. For the Statistical provision 
there is a Latent risk measure: Lr = s*L, where s stands for the average expected loss 
(between 0% and 1.5%, depending on the risk bucket considered). The annual provision 
is StP = Lr – SP. If SP < Lr (low problem loans), then StP > 0 (building up of the statistical 
allowance). If, on the contrary, SP> Lr (high problem loans), then StP < 0 (depletion of the 
statistical allowance). The statistical fund allowance is calculated: StF = StPt + StFt-1, 
with a limit: 0 < StF < 3*Lr. Therefore, the annual total provision in the new system (generic + 
specific + statistical), assuming that limits are not reached is: 
 
AP = GP + SP + StP= g*L + SP + (Lr – SP) = g*L + s*L 
The statistical provision it is expected to have a counterbalancing effect on the 
strong cyclical behaviour of loan loss provisions in Spain. The statistical provision increases 
precisely during the expansionary phase. During recessions the specific provisions 
increase while the use of the statistical allowance smoothes its impact on the profit and 
loss account of the bank. 
Chart A.1 shows the impact of the old and new system of provisions. Under the 
old system the joint effect of the specific plus the general provisions was strongly cyclical. 
The introduction of the statistical provision has a counterbalancing effect as it has the 
opposite cycle profile. The joint effect of the old system plus the statistical provision is 
to smooth provisions during the cycle. As shown in Chart A.2, the statistical allowance 
is built up during the expansionary period (low problem loans) and decreases in the 
downturn23. 
Chart A.1 and A.2 allow us to illustrate the impact of the statistical provision over 
the business cycle. Credit grows strongly during the first two years and loan losses are very 
low (as well as specific provisions). From the third year a relatively abrupt economic 
landing starts, with an increase in problem loans and, subsequently, in specific provisions. 
                                                                          
23. Charts A.1 and A.2, taken from Fernández de Lis, Martínez and Saurina (2001), are based on the simulation exercise. 
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The statistical allowance is built up during the first four years as long as the statistical 
provision is above the specific one. As soon as the specific provision requirements outpace 
the statistical ones (year 5), the statistical fund is depleted reaching its lowest level in year 8 
when it is almost exhausted. From year 9 onwards, the build-up resumes as the cyclical 
position of the economy improves. 
 
Chart A.1 . Impact of the old and the new system (over total loans) 
 
Chart A.2. Statistical allowance (over total fund) 
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Table 1. Summary statistics and definition of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis 
Sample period: 1988-2004 (annual data). Sample size: 1374 observations. 
TCLLP: ratio of total net specific, general and statistical loan loss provisions over 
total assets. CLLP: ratio of total net specific and general loan loss provisions over total 
assets. NPL: ratio of doubtful assets over total assets. IBOL: general index of the Madrid 
Stock Exchange. LTA: ratio of total loans over total assets. GDPG: real GDP growth. CAP: 
total capital ratio (regulatory capital over risk-weighted assets). CAPT1: Tier 1 ratio (Tier 1 
capital over risk-weighted assets). BUFFER: capital buffer (the relative excess of capital hold 
by the bank over the minimum regulatory requirements). NOI: ratio of net income before 
provisions, extraordinary items and taxes over total assets. SIZE: log of total assets.
 
 
Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
TCLLP 0.44 0.39 -1.12 3.56
CLLP 0.40 0.41 -1.12 3.56
NPL 1.87 1.49 0.00 12.62
IBOL 518 282 214 1012
LTA 55.29 13.47 10.98 98.95
GDPG 3.08 1.51 -1.03 5.10
CAP 11.41 2.94 1.87 27.21
CAPT1 9.97 3.23 1.30 27.21
BUFFER 42.66 36.72 -76.60 240.10
NOI 1.38 0.78 -4.77 4.45
SIZE 14.76 1.58 10.32 20.20
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Table 2. Estimation of the model of determinants of loan loss provisions charged by 
Spanish banks: Basic model 
Dependent variable: CLLP, the ratio of total net specific and general loan loss provisions over 
total assets. Estimation method: GMM, equation in first differences. Columns 1, 3 and 5 
correspond to the period 1988-1999; columns 2, 4 and 6 to the period 2000-2004. Columns 
3 and 4 (5 and 6) allow for differences in smoothing across banks of different ownership 
(listed and unlisted). NPL: ratio of doubtful assets over total assets. IBOL: general index of the 
Madrid Stock Exchange. LTA: ratio of total loans over total assets. GDPG: real GDP growth. 
CAP: total capital ratio (regulatory capital over risk-weighted assets). NOI: ratio of net income 
before provisions, extraordinary items and taxes over total assets. SIZE: log of total assets. 
BANK: a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is commercial, 0 otherwise. QUOTED: a dummy 
variable worth 1 if the bank is quoted, 0 otherwise.  
m1 and m2 stand for first- and second-order residual autocorrelation, based on 
estimates of the residuals in first differences. IBOL, GDPG and  SIZE, are considered 
exogenous. Instruments for the endogenous variables: GMM with lags 2 to 3 for NPL, LTA, 
CAP and NOI. In columns 3 and 4 BANK*NOI lag 2 and in columns 5 and 6 lag 2. All 
instruments selected as in DPD (Arellano and Bond (1991)). ***, ** and * denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-values in brackets. 
Explanatory
variables Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6
NPLit 0.115*** 0.236*** 0.115*** 0.193*** 0.121*** 0.234***
(0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.000)*** (0.024)*** (0.000)*** (0.009)***
IBOLit -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000* 0.000
(0.012) *** (0.366)*** (0.009)*** (0.387)*** (0.056)*** (0.384)***
LTAit 0.013*** -0.002 0.015*** -0.002*** 0.011*** -0.001***
(0.001) *** (0.644) *** (0.000) *** (0.511) *** (0.004) *** (0.736) ***
GDPGt -0.044** -0.053* -0.047*** -0.054* -0.045** -0.056**
(0.015) *** (0.059) *** (0.008) *** (0.057) *** (0.012) *** (0.048) ***
CAPit-1 -0.012 0.003 -0.004 0.000 -0.013*** 0.004***
(0.309) *** (0.702) *** (0.729) *** (0.948) *** (0.257) *** (0.615) ***
NOI it 0.148*** 0.016 0.128** 0.057 0.116** 0.025
(0.007) *** (0.857) *** (0.035) *** (0.627) *** (0.037) (0.783) ***
BANK*NOIit -- -- -0.036 -0.036 -- --
-- -- (0.704) *** (0.763) *** -- --
QUOTED*NOIit -- -- -- -- 0.039*** -0.237***
-- -- -- -- (0.646) *** (0.401) ***
SIZEit 0.018 0.043 -0.016 0.053 -0.018 0.037
(0.830) *** (0.516) *** (0.834) *** (0.453) *** (0.831) *** (0.609) ***
m1 -3.391*** -3.652*** -3.354*** -3.666*** -3.471*** -3.603***
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)***
m2 -1.428 0.391 -1.314 0.456 -1.376 0.377
(0.153) *** (0.696) *** (0.189) *** (0.648) *** (0.169) *** (0.706) ***
Sargan test 95.33 38.36 116.46 49.08 105.61 42.58
(0.278)*** (0.363)*** (0.319)*** (0.313)*** (0.306)*** (0.361)***
Period 1988-1999 2000-2004 1988-1999 2000-2004 1988-1999 2000-2004
Nº Obs. 959 332 959 332 959 332
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Table 3. Estimation of the model of determinants of loan loss provisions charged  
by Spanish banks: Robustness analysis for different definitions of regulatory capital 
Dependent variable: CLLP, the ratio of total net specific and general loan loss provisions over 
total assets. Estimation method: GMM, equation in first differences. NPL: ratio of doubtful 
assets over total assets. IBOL: general index of the Madrid Stock Exchange. LTA: ratio of 
total loans over total assets. GDPG: real GDP growth. CAP: total capital ratio (regulatory 
capital over risk-weighted assets). CAPT1: Tier 1 ratio (Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted 
assets). BUFFER: capital buffer (the relative excess of capital hold by the bank over the 
minimum regulatory requirements). NOI: ratio of net income before provisions, extraordinary 
items and taxes over total assets. SIZE: log of total assets. 
m1 and m2 stand for first- and second-order residual autocorrelation, based on 
estimates of the residuals in first differences. IBOL, GDPG and  SIZE, are considered 
exogenous. Instruments for the endogenous variables: GMM with lags 2 to 3 for NPL, LTA, 
CAP, CAPT1, BUFFER and NOI, In columns 3 and 6, lags 2 to 4 are used. All instruments 
selected as in DPD (Arellano and Bond (1991)). ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. P-values in brackets. 
Explanatory
variables Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6
NPL it 0.117*** 0.114*** 0.121*** 0.241*** 0.228*** 0.213***
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.009) *** (0.008) *** (0.013) ***
IBOL it -0.000***  -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***
(0.011) *** (0.014) *** (0.014) *** (0.304) *** (0.312) *** (0.344) ***
LTA it 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) *** (0.001) *** (0.000) *** (0.740) *** (0.886) *** (0.900) ***
GDPG t -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.047*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.052***
(0.014) *** (0.018) *** (0.008) *** (0.052) *** (0.063) *** (0.073) ***
CAPT1 it-1 -0.011*** -- -- 0.002*** -- --
(0.367) *** -- -- (0.847) *** -- --
BUFFER it-1 -- -0.001*** -- -- -0.000*** --
-- (0.224) *** -- -- (0.807) *** --
NOI it 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.131*** 0.001*** 0.023*** 0.044***
(0.007) *** (0.012) *** (0.024) *** (0.991) *** (0.786) *** (0.599) ***
SIZE it 0.018*** 0.021*** -0.009*** 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.017***
(0.834) *** (0.809) *** (0.917) *** (0.702) *** (0.856) *** (0.799) ***
m1 -3.370*** -3.423*** -3.335*** -3.584*** -3.663*** -3.669***
(0.001) *** (0.001) *** (0.001) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
m2 -1.422*** -1.453*** -1.368*** 0.375*** 0.370*** 0.391***
(0.155) *** (0.146) *** (0.171) *** (0.708) *** (0.711) *** (0.696) ***
Sargan test 93.64*** 93.99*** 105.22*** 37.82*** 39.73*** 31.54***
(0.320) *** (0.311) *** (0.244) *** (0.386) *** (0.308) *** (0.249) ***
Period 1988-1999 1988-1999 1988-1999 2000-2004 2000-2004 2000-2004
Nº Obs. 959 959 959 332 332 332
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Table 4. Estimation of the model of determinants of loan loss provisions charged by 
Spanish banks: Total loan loss provisions (general, specific and statistical). 
Dependent variable: TCLLP, the ratio of total net specific, general and statistical loan loss 
provisions over total assets. Estimation method: GMM, equation in first differences. NPL: ratio 
of doubtful assets over total assets. IBOL: general index of the Madrid Stock Exchange. LTA: 
ratio of total loans over total assets. GDPG: real GDP growth. CAP: total capital ratio 
(regulatory capital over risk-weighted assets). CAPT1: Tier 1 ratio (Tier 1 capital over risk-
weighted assets). BUFFER: capital buffer (the relative excess of capital hold by the bank over 
the minimum regulatory requirements). NOI: ratio of net income before provisions, 
extraordinary items and taxes over total assets. SIZE: log of total assets. 
m1 and m2 stand for first- and second-order residual autocorrelation, based on 
estimates of the residuals in first differences. IBOL, GDPG and SIZE, are considered 
exogenous. Instruments for the endogenous variables: GMM with lags 2 to 3 for NPL, LTA, 
CAP, CAPT1 and BUFFER.. All instruments selected as in DPD (Arellano and Bond (1991)). 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. P-values in brackets. 
Explanatory
variables
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
NPL it 0.133*** 0.114*** 0.131***
(0.049)*** (0.084)*** (0.052)***
IBOL it -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
LTA it 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.611)*** (0.404)*** (0.287)***
GDPGt 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.885)*** (0.758)*** (0.873)***
CAPit-1 -0.006*** -- --
(0.404)*** -- --
CAPT1it-1 -- -0.011*** --
-- (0.271)*** --
BUFFERit-1 -- -- -0.000***
-- -- (0.349)***
NOI it 0.118*** 0.139*** 0.121***
(0.083)*** (0.043)*** (0.075)***
SIZE it 0.279*** 0.243*** 0.244***
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.006)***
m1 -3.469*** -3.521*** -3.490***
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
m2 -1.295*** -1.300*** -1.319***
(0.195)*** (0.194)*** (0.187)***
Sargan test 62.39*** 60.66*** 62.99***
(0.153)*** (0.192)*** (0.141)***
Period 2000-2004 2000-2004 2000-2004
Nº Obs. 332 332 332
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS  
WORKING PAPERS1  
1001 JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE AND CARLOS THOMAS: Banking competition, collateral constraints and optimal 
monetary policy. 
1002 CRISTINA BARCELÓ AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The response of household wealth to the risk of losing the job: 
evidence from differences in firing costs. 
1003 
 
1004 
ALEXANDER KARAIVANOV, SONIA RUANO, JESÚS SAURINA AND ROBERT TOWNSEND: No bank, one bank, 
several banks: does it matter for investment? 
GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS AND HUGO RODRÍGUEZ MENDIZÁBAL: Asymmetric standing facilities: an unexploited 
monetary policy tool. 
1005 
 
1006 
 
 
1007 
1008 
GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, JOSE A. LOPEZ AND JESÚS SAURINA: How does competition impact bank  
risk-taking? 
GIUSEPPE BERTOLA, AURELIJUS DABUSINSKAS, MARCO HOEBERICHTS, MARIO IZQUIERDO, CLAUDIA 
KWAPIL, JEREMI MONTORNÈS AND DANIEL RADOWSKI: Price, wage and employment response to shocks: 
evidence from the WDN Survey. 
JAVIER MENCÍA: Testing non-linear dependence in the Hedge Fund industry. 
ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER: From proximity to distant banking: Spanish banks in the EMU. 
1009 GALO NUÑO: Optimal research and development expenditure: a general equilibrium approach. 
1010 
1011 
 
1012 
1013 
1014 
1015 
LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ AND PABLO BURRIEL: Is a Calvo price setting model consistent with micro price data? 
JENS HAGENDORFF, IGNACIO HERNANDO, MARÍA J. NIETO AND LARRY D. WALL: What do premiums paid for 
bank M&As reflect? The case of the European Union. 
DAVID DE ANTONIO LIEDO: General equilibrium restrictions for dynamic factor models. 
JAMES COSTAIN, JUAN F. JIMENO AND CARLOS THOMAS: Employment fluctuations in a dual labor market. 
LUIS M. VICEIRA AND RICARDO GIMENO: The euro as a reserve currency for global investors. 
PALOMA LÓPEZ-GARCÍA AND JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO: Understanding the Spanish business innovation gap:
The role of spillovers and firms' absorptive capacity. 
1016 
 
1017 
1018 
 
1019 
 
1020 
1021 
 
1022 
 
1023 
1024 
1025 
 
1026 
 
1027 
1028 
1029 
1030 
 
1031 
 
AITOR LACUESTA AND SERGIO PUENTE: El efecto del ciclo económico en las entradas y salidas de inmigrantes  
en España. 
REBEKKA CHRISTOPOULOU, JUAN F. JIMENO AND ANA LAMO: Changes in the wage structure in EU countries. 
THOMAS BREUER, MARTIN JANDAČKA, JAVIER MENCÍA AND MARTIN SUMMER: A systematic approach to 
multi-period stress testing of portfolio credit risk. 
LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ  AND PABLO BURRIEL: Micro-based estimates of heterogeneous pricing rules: The United States 
vs. the euro area. 
ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER AND VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS: I.T. investment and intangibles: Evidence from banks.
LUISA LAMBERTINI, CATERINA MENDICINO AND MARIA TERESA PUNZI: Expectations-driven cycles  
in the housing market. 
JULIÁN MESSINA, PHILIP DU CAJU, CLÁUDIA FILIPA DUARTE, NIELS LYNGGÅRD HANSEN AND MARIO 
IZQUIERDO: The incidence of nominal and real wage rigidity: an individual-based sectoral approach. 
ALESSIO MORO: Development, growth and volatility. 
LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ AND ALBERTO CABRERO: Does housing really lead the business cycle? 
JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI: Is judicial inefficiency increasing the house property market weight in Spain? 
Evidence at the local level. 
MAXIMO CAMACHO, GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS AND PILAR PONCELA: Green shoots in the Euro area. A real 
time measure. 
AITOR ERCE AND JAVIER DÍAZ-CASSOU: Creditor discrimination during sovereign debt restructurings. 
RAFAEL REPULLO, JESÚS SAURINA AND CARLOS TRUCHARTE: Mitigating the pro-cyclicality of Basel II. 
ISABEL ARGIMÓN AND JENIFER RUIZ: The effects of national discretions on banks. 
GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ, STEVEN ONGENA, JOSÉ-LUIS PEYDRÓ AND JESÚS SAURINA: Credit supply: identifying 
balance-sheet channels with loan applications and granted loans. 
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Determinants of economic growth: A Bayesian panel data approach. 
 
                                                          
1. Previously published Working Papers are listed in the Banco de España publications catalogue. 
1032 
 
1033 
 
1034 
 
1035 
1036 
1037 
 
1038 
1039 
 
1101 
 
1102 
1103 
 
1104 
 
1105 
 
1106 
1107 
 
1108 
1109 
 
1110 
1111 
1112 
 
1113 
1114 
1115 
1116 
 
1117 
 
1118 
 
 
 
GABE J. DE BONDT, TUOMAS A. PELTONEN AND DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: Booms and busts in China's stock 
market: Estimates based on fundamentals. 
CARMEN MARTÍNEZ-CARRASCAL AND JULIAN VON LANDESBERGER: Explaining the demand for money by non-
financial corporations in the euro area: A macro and a micro view. 
CARMEN MARTÍNEZ-CARRASCAL: Cash holdings, firm size and access to external finance. Evidence for  
the euro area. 
CÉSAR ALONSO-BORREGO: Firm behavior, market deregulation and productivity in Spain. 
OLYMPIA BOVER: Housing purchases and the dynamics of housing wealth. 
DAVID DE ANTONIO LIEDO AND ELENA FERNÁNDEZ MUÑOZ: Nowcasting Spanish GDP growth in real time: “One 
and a half months earlier”. 
FRANCESCA VIANI: International financial flows, real exchange rates and cross-border insurance. 
FERNANDO BRONER, TATIANA DIDIER, AITOR ERCE AND SERGIO L. SCHMUKLER: Gross capital flows: dynamics 
and crises. 
GIACOMO MASIER AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: Consumption and initial mortgage conditions: evidence from 
survey data. 
PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS AND ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Endogenous fiscal consolidations. 
CÉSAR CALDERÓN, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO AND LUIS SERVÉN: Is infrastructure capital productive? A dynamic 
heterogeneous approach. 
MICHAEL DANQUAH, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO AND BAZOUMANA OUATTARA: TFP growth and its determinants: 
nonparametrics and model averaging. 
JUAN CARLOS BERGANZA AND CARMEN BROTO: Flexible inflation targets, forex interventions and exchange rate 
volatility in emerging countries. 
FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, JAVIER J. PÉREZ AND MARTA RODRÍGUEZ VIVES: Fiscal data revisions in Europe. 
ANGEL GAVILÁN, PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS, JUAN F. JIMENO AND JUAN A. ROJAS: Fiscal policy, structural  
reforms and external imbalances: a quantitative evaluation for Spain. 
EVA ORTEGA, MARGARITA RUBIO AND CARLOS THOMAS: House purchase versus rental in Spain. 
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Dynamic panels with predetermined regressors: likelihood-based estimation and 
Bayesian averaging with an application to cross-country growth. 
NIKOLAI STÄHLER AND CARLOS THOMAS: FiMod – a DSGE model for fiscal policy simulations. 
ÁLVARO CARTEA AND JOSÉ PENALVA: Where is the value in high frequency trading?  
FILIPA SÁ AND FRANCESCA VIANI: Shifts in portfolio preferences of international investors: an application to 
sovereign wealth funds. 
REBECA ANGUREN MARTÍN: Credit cycles: Evidence based on a non-linear model for developed countries. 
LAURA HOSPIDO: Estimating non-linear models with multiple fixed effects: A computational note. 
ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO AND CRISTIAN BARTOLUCCI: Income and democracy: Revisiting the evidence. 
AGUSTÍN MARAVALL HERRERO AND DOMINGO PÉREZ CAÑETE: Applying and interpreting model-based seasonal 
adjustment. The euro-area industrial production series. 
JULIO CÁCERES-DELPIANO: Is there a cost associated with an increase in family size beyond child investment? 
Evidence from developing countries. 
DANIEL PÉREZ, VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS AND JESÚS SAURINA: Do dynamic provisions reduce income smoothing 
using loan loss provisions? 
 
 
 
 
Unidad de Publicaciones 
Alcalá 522, 28027 Madrid 
Telephone +34 91 338 6363. Fax +34 91 338 6488 
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es 
www.bde.es 
